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Copyright Philosophy of Science 2016 Preprint (not copyedited or formatted) Please use DOI when citing or quoting teaching. But they do not all learn the same applications of these laws, and they are not therefore all affected in the same ways by changes in quantum mechanical practice. On the road to professional specialization, a few physical scientists encounter only the basic principles of quantum mechanics. Others study in detail the paradigm applications of these principles to chemistry, still others to the physics of the solid state, and so on. What quantum mechanics means to each of them depends on what courses he has had, what texts he has read, and which journals he studies. … [T]hough quantum mechanics (or Newtonian dynamics, or electromagnetic theory) is a paradigm for many scientific groups, it is not the same paradigm for all. (Kuhn 1962, 49-50) These ideas are developed by Peter Galison, who argues that different scientific groups imbed what can seem the same concepts in very different networks of practice and inference that thus embody different understandings. Groups with different 'thick' understandings communicate to some extent via stripped down 'pidgin' languages---but the understandings and practices imbedded in these pidgins are far from sufficient to do the tasks of any of the separate groups (Galison 1997 ).
Kuhn's points generated decades of discussion about the rationality of theory change, supposing that he had shown that new theory and old do not refer to the same thing with the same words and hence do not contradict each other. My concern is rather with the use to which we put scientific knowledge. The topic in this symposium is unity of method. Maybe there are somethings all scientific methods have in common and there may be some good purposes served by adumbrating these. But when it comes to use, it is crucial to stress the disunity and particularity of the methods and practices that interpret and support scientific claims. There has long been the rosy hope that we can establish results that sail free of the methods, practices, techniques, successful predictions and applications, and rich web of concrete low theory that interpret and support them: We can take scientific results and put them on a shelf in a knowledge supermarket for consumers to take away to use in new homes. This is dangerous. If the uses we make of scientific claims are to be successful, we must ensure that the methods and practices used to establish a scientific claim are sufficient to support the inferences we draw from it. To do the contrary is to fall into science by pun.
The claims of science must be supported---in detail---by empirical facts. This support is witnessed by success in predicting and intervening precisely in the world. If so, what is supported are claims as interpreted through the network of concrete assumptions and practices that afford the successful predictions and interventions. Although I shall illustrate my worries about unity of method by drawing out the lessons of causal pluralism, there is nothing special about causality; what is true of it is widely true. It is important to keep different methods differentiated because they so often are methods appropriate to finding out about different things, even if these things share a common name; and what follows from knowledge about one of these things will not follow from knowledge of another. Figure 1 illustrates differences between monist and pluralist accounts of scientific concepts, using 'cause' for illustration. Causation is what Otto Neurath called a Ballung concept, a concept with rough, porous boundaries, a congestion of different ideas and implications that in various combinations are brought into focus for different purposes and in different contexts (Cf. Cartwright et al. 1996, Cartwright and Bradburn 2011) . Concepts like this can, and often do, play a central role in science, and especially in social science. But they cannot do so in their original form. To function properly in a scientific context they need to be made precise. The right-hand side of figure 1 pictures a central, non-fuzzy core to this concept that can, possibly with great effort, be characterised precisely; 'causes' picks out some one relation; and the variety of methods employed in discovering causes are all methods for testing for that one relation. We establish this relation in a variety of ways but no matter how it is established, we can draw the same conclusions.
Despite vast philosophical effort, we have not found any such central core that can properly be used in science, where rigor matters. The notions on offer and our theories about them are too thin; they do not allow us to draw many conclusions beyond what follows narrowly from the assumption that a given relation satisfies our definition. We don't have an empirically wellsupported web of inferences that attribution of the defined relation supports.
The left-hand side of figure 1 fits better with what I see in scientific practice. 'Cause' has no precise 'central core'. The trick in bringing it into a scientific context is not to find the 'right' characterization but rather to construct a characterization that does the jobs that we want to do when we use the term in that context. When it comes to testing causal claims, different methods are appropriate to different characterizations---and correlatively, for different characterizations, different inferences can be drawn from claims employing the concept 'cause'. Characterizations will be done in different ways in different scientific disciplines, serving different ends and to fit with the different concepts, methods, assumptions, and standards operating in these disciplines. The more precise scientific concepts that result are then different from each other and different from the original Ballung concept.
I sometimes use the ugly word 'precisification' to describe the process by which a Ballung concept is transformed into one fit for science. Sophia Efstathiou (2009) calls this process "found science" on the analogy of found art. Damien Hirst's shark in formaldehyde is still a shark but it is not the same shark as when it was swimming in the sea. It has been made suitable for an artistic context, to serve specific artistic purposes. In Efstathiou's words, the shark has been "founded"---Copyright Philosophy of Science 2016 Preprint (not copyedited or formatted) Please use DOI when citing or quoting given a form appropriate to serve its new purposes---in the artistic context. But the shark 'founded' as art loses most of its original functionings, including its ability to be founded in other contexts, such as shark soup.
Similarly the different foundings of a Ballung concept like 'cause' or 'race' are not different ways of characterizing what remains the same concept. What can be shown true of 'cause' under one founding cannot be presumed true under another, and empirical methods that work for telling where one obtains do not normally secure a causal relation that has been founded in any other way. In particular they do not license inferences that follow given other foundings.
The left-hand side of figure 1 pictures causal pluralism: different concepts differently founded for different purposes, all equally entitled to the name. Causal pluralism is not a philosopher's game; it has real bite. We must not establish causal claims that have one interpretation, then use them as if they had a different one or we are headed for disaster. As both Popper and the Positivists insisted, where scientific claims are to be taken seriously, it matters exactly what those claims are.
Consider evidence-based policy, where three different kinds of causal claims are regularly conflated: (a) Generic claims that hold locally: a cause-kind causes an effect-kind in some particular kind of situation ('C causes E somewhere'); (b) generic claims that C causes E 'widely'---across a range of situation types; (c) singular predictions that C will cause E in a specific new situation ('C will cause E here').
1 Here is an example, not untypical but particularly striking because it mixes all three together, without note, in just one sentence, from a defense of randomized controlled trials (RCTs) in development economics by Esther Duflo and Michael Kremer, the first an MIT economist, the second at Harvard, both at the Jamil Poverty Action Lab : ''The benefits of knowing which programs work … extend far beyond any program or agency, and credible impact evaluations … can offer reliable guidance to international organizations, governments, donors, and … NGO's beyond national borders." (Duflo and Kremer 2005, 205) 'Which programs work' is about what works to produce the targeted effect widely; impact evaluations tell us that a program produced the effect somewhere; 'reliable guidance' predicts that the program will produce the effect in a new situation. This kind of conflation can lead to bad policy predictions and bad policy predictions can lead to bad development outcomes, completely contrary to the hopes of the authors.
The worry is that policy will proceed by pun. A program is implemented somewhere and a careful after-the-fact evaluation is carried out to see if it achieved the intended results, say via an RCT. This can show that the program had a positive effect size there---e.g. a positive difference in the mean of the targeted effect in treatment and control groups---in the situation where it was tested. Add a handful of metaphysical and empirical assumptions, including that the situation of the treatment and control groups is governed by a set of the same linear causal laws, that there is a probability measure over the quantities in those causal laws for the combined treatment/control population, and that the study design ensures that the treatment and control groups differ only by values for the treatment variable and its downstream effects (or nearly enough so). Then a positive effect size shows that the treatment genuinely figures as a cause of the effect in a law governing that situation there (Cf. Cartwright and Hardie 2012) .
This provides evidence that the same cause figures in a law for a new situation only supposing that the new situation is governed by the same relevant causal law as the study situation.
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And it provides evidence that the effect size will be positive in a new situation only if 2 in addition the interactive causal factors in that law have the same distribution in the target as in the study situation---an assumption that is often unlikely to be true. So a great deal of work needs to be done if the methods that establish 'It works there' are to be relevant to 'It works here', and you cannot avoid this work by just eliding the 'here' and 'there' and acting as if the claim established and the claim put to use are one and the same.
Of course the problem is not restricted to concepts of causality but is endemic throughout the sciences. Nor am I alone in my concerns. William Wimsatt, for example, issues a similar warning against punning in science: "Applying a heuristic to a problem transforms the problem into a non-equivalent but intuitively related problem … But it is not the same problem, so beware: answers to the transformed problem may not be answers to the original problem." (Wimsatt 2007, 135) 
Some Foundings for 'Causes'.
There are a variety of different accounts of causality prevalent in philosophy of science now. Each lays out important facts about how a system of relations must behave if the relations are to be labelled 'causal' under that particular precisification; each can be seen as a distinct way of founding more precisely the concept of causation. I shall focus on two: (1) a notion of causality suited to James Woodward's level invariance test, and (2) a notion characterized by the three basic axioms for causal Bayes nets (CBNs): (i) the causal Markov condition (CMC), (ii) faithfulness, and (iii) minimality.
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(1) Woodward (2003) introduces level invariance in the context of what I call "epistemically convenient linear deterministic systems" (Cartwright 2007, 161) or ECLDSs. A linear deterministic system (LDS) is epistemically convenient if each effect in the system has at least one special cause that does not cause anything else in the system except by causing that effect, and the set of special causes is variation-free. 4 Suppose we take---as in (Cartwright 2007, 154) for instance---a set of familiar-looking axioms like irreflexivity and asymmetry that a scientific concept of causation might satisfy, plus the assumption that the causal laws of an ECLDS are responsible for any other true functional relations that obtain in it (i.e. that all 'spurious' relations derive from genuine causal laws) as an implicit definition---in Efstathiou's words, a 'founding'---of a concept of causality that could obtain in an ECLDS. It is then provable that testing for Woodward's level invariance is a reliable method for arriving at causes in the sense of 'cause' picked out by these axioms: an equation satisfies Woodward's level invariance criterion if and only if it is a causally correct principle in this particular precisification of 'cause'.
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(2) Let me now turn to Causal Bayes nets. Here we find theorems that show the tight fit I 2 Almost 'only if'. Effect size is a function of the mean, which can of course be the same without the same distribution. 3 Roughly CMC says that causal parents screen off effects from everything else except effects of the effect; Faithfulness, that causal parents and offspring are probabilistically dependent; minimality, that there are no more causal relations than necessary to account for the probabilistic dependencies and independencies described under CMC and Faithfulness (Cf. Spirtes, Glymour, and Scheines 2000) . 4 That is, together they can take any combination of values from their separate ranges. 5 The proof also provides a much needed characterization of what it means for an equation with a dummy variable representing 'missing factors'---like the regression equations Woodward and others discuss that play a central role in social and economic sciences---to be causally correct.
Copyright Philosophy of Science 2016 Preprint (not copyedited or formatted) Please use DOI when citing or quoting advocate among characterization, methods, and use. Many of the CBN algorithms for discovering causal claims are provably valid so long as the three central CBN axioms are satisfied.
6 That means we can take the axioms to characterize what is meant by 'cause' and be assured that the methods for finding out about causes are reliable for finding out about relations thus characterized as causal.
We also are assured that we have reliable ways to put that causal knowledge to use. There is, for instance, a well-known "manipulation theorem" in (Spirtes, Glymour, and Scheines 2000, 47) that describes what happens under a 'manipulation' of a given quantity to the probabilities of other quantities, assuming these are all governed by causal principles that satisfy the CBN axioms relative to the joint probability over the total set of quantities. But 'manipulation' is a very specific kind of change under very specific assumptions about the operative causal principles, including their stability as values of variables change. So warranting the claim that some particular set of actions we perform count as manipulations will be no easy matter and we must be careful not to be misled by casual use of the term 'manipulation '. 7 This tight fit of method and use to characterization has a downside, however. The methods are appropriate only for the concept of causality specified in the characterization, and similarly for the inferences we draw from causal claims, for instance about what will happen under manipulation. Wolfgang Spohn, I take it, would be happy with this. He is explicit in maintaining that causality is characterized by CBN axioms: "Bayesian nets are all there is to causal dependence", he claims (Spohn 2001) . But that does not seem to be how all advocates of the methods see it.
Consider, for instance, a repeated conversation between Clark Glymour and me, which can help to make clear the points I have been urging and will bring the discussion back to the start. I worry about cases where the specified axioms fail. Glymour responds by showing all the wonderful ways that have been developed (and some that people have long been using) to cope in those cases to draw causal conclusions without relying on the axioms. But what then are we making claims about? How are we to understand what we mean when we claim 'X causes Y'? Glymour seems uninterested in characterizations of 'causes' and so far as I know no characterization has been offered as such since the first work by Glymour, Scheines, and Spirtes (which seemed to adopt my view that generic causal claims are claims about what singular causal happenings would occur with what probability---inviting, of course, a characterization in turn for the concept of singular causation).
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Perhaps though I am illicitly supposing causal pluralism. Perhaps all these different methods, the ones where the axioms hold and those that cope when some of the axioms fail, are---as on the right-hand side of figure 1---just different methods of finding out about a single causal relation, and in particular one for which the inferences we wish to make hold. In that case my worry about drawing inferences by pun is unfounded. But still the overall question looms. What guarantees that these methods are correct for establishing claims that support our inferences? No matter whether a term bears a monist or a pluralist interpretation, in science, where rigor matters, we need arguments to justify that the methods used for establishing claims support the conclusions drawn from them. There may be a kind of unity of method here: Our methods for testing claims
